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Remarks:

FYI.

This is an interdepartmental study by the Scientific Intelligence Committee. A previous study, noted by USIB, dated 20 May 1968 covered the chemical warfare capabilities of the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact countries rely almost entirely upon the Soviet Union for the equipment to provide them with a chemical warfare capability.

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*The Chemical Warfare Capabilities of the
Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Countries*

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Scientific Intelligence Study

THE CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES OF THE
NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

September 1968

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iii

PREFACE

This interdepartmental study of the offensive and defensive chemical warfare capabilities through 1973 of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries was prepared by the Biological and Chemical Warfare Intelligence Subcommittee of the Scientific Intelligence Committee. It was approved by the Scientific Intelligence Committee on 15 August 1968.

The chemical warfare capabilities of the NSWP countries* are considered with respect to research and development, production, facilities, military organization and training, and storage depots for toxic munitions. Smoke and flame agents, although usually regarded as chemical warfare materiel, have not been included. This publication reflects material available after 1960 on the chemical warfare doctrine and munitions of the NSWP countries, including photography and evidence from various reliable sources. It is based on intelligence available as of 1 August 1968.

* Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania.

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v

CONTENTS

| | <i>Page</i> |
|--|-------------|
| PREFACE | iii |
| PROBLEM | 1 |
| SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS | 1 |
| DISCUSSION | 2 |
| Introduction | 2 |
| Military organization | 2 |
| Chemical warfare training | 3 |
| Rumania | 3 |
| Poland | 6 |
| Czechoslovakia | 8 |
| East Germany | 10 |
| Bulgaria | 12 |
| Hungary | 14 |
| CW defensive capabilities | 14 |
| Detection and identification | 14 |
| Decontamination | 16 |
| Antidotes | 18 |
| Personnel protective equipment | 20 |
| Production of protective equipment | 23 |
| CW agent research and development facilities | 23 |
| General | 23 |
| Bulgaria | 23 |
| Czechoslovakia | 24 |
| East Germany | 25 |
| Hungary | 25 |
| Poland | 26 |
| Rumania | 26 |
| Toxic agent production | 27 |
| Bulgaria | 27 |
| Czechoslovakia | 27 |
| East Germany | 28 |
| Hungary | 28 |
| Poland | 28 |
| Rumania | 29 |
| Storage of CW agents in NSWP countries | 29 |
| East Germany | 29 |
| Poland | 31 |
| Rumania | 31 |
| Hungary | 34 |
| Czechoslovakia | 34 |

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X

vi

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

APPENDICES

| | <i>Page</i> |
|--|-------------|
| A. Manufacturing facilities associated with production of protective equipment | 35 |
| B. Research institutes associated with CW activities | 37 |
| C. Manufacturing facilities associated with CW agent production .. | 40 |
| D. Personalities associated with CW Activities | 42 |

FIGURES

| | <i>Page</i> |
|---|-------------|
| 1. Rumanian defensive CW training. Equipment includes Soviet ShM mask, PKhR detection kit and impermeable suit .. | 5 |
| 2. CW training center, Biskupiec | 6 |
| 3. Decontamination exercise in the Polish navy | 8 |
| 4. CW training center, Jaromer | 9 |
| 5. Czech artillerymen in tactical training | 10 |
| 6. CW training exercise in the East German army | 11 |
| 7. CW alert in the Bulgarian ground forces | 13 |
| 8. New-Type Soviet protective mask | 21 |
| 9. CW storage depot, Kapen | 30 |
| 10. CW storage depot, Choszczno | 32 |
| 11. CW storage depot, Radzyn | 33 |

25X1

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TOP SECRET

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THE CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES OF THE NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

PROBLEM

To assess the chemical warfare (CW) capabilities of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries through 1973.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The military forces of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries are capable of furnishing major defensive support to the Soviet armed forces in CW operations. Although there is increasing evidence of emphasis on ground forces offensive operations, the offensive CW capability of the NSWP forces is still dependent on the Soviets for agents and munitions and will probably continue to be for the next 5 years.

2. No major storage depots for CW toxic agents and munitions have been identified within the NSWP countries. Of the 14 sites reported to contain toxic CW agents, only 6 have been associated with specific chemical agents—mostly of World War I types—and the quantities of agents claimed or implied at these depots appear sufficient only for defensive training requirements.

3. Chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) training programs in the NSWP countries have been considerably expanded in recent years. At least two new CBR schools have been established and an increased amount of CW instruction has been included in civil defense programs.

4. There is no evidence of quantity production of nerve agents in the NSWP countries at this time, even though they have the technical knowledge and the industrial potential, but limited production of both nerve agents and conventional World War I-type CW agents is indicated by reports of toxicity tests. Soviet policy will probably continue to limit the production of all kinds of CW agents in the NSWP countries during the next 5 years to the quantities necessary for research, development and testing.

5. Scientists in the NSWP countries are showing an increased interest in G- and V-agent research—new methods of synthesis, variations in structure and toxicity, and mode of action—and in developing new lethal agents, as well as increasing the toxicities and improving other properties of older existing agents. Excellent research is being reported, especially in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, on psychochemicals of military significance—ergot alkaloids, quinuclidine derivatives, curariform compounds, and hallucinogens of the mescaline and psilocybin types.

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6. Protective equipment in use in the NSWP countries is adequate and comparable with that in use worldwide. Production of individual protective masks, clothing, and related items is generally carried out in accord with Soviet specifications and designs, but a new mask with a flat triangular face-piece has appeared in East Germany and Hungary and a trend toward a single multipurpose-type garment for general issue has been noticed. Considerable research has been done on nerve agent antidotes and cholinesterase reactivators, particularly in Rumania and Bulgaria, and at least two new types of antidotes have been developed.

7. The NSWP countries have a large variety of excellent detection equipment, mostly of Soviet origin. The Soviet GSP-1 and -11 automatic CW nerve agent alarms now appear to be distributed sparingly within the NSWP countries.

8. Soviet decontamination equipment of all kinds is available in the NSWP countries to meet any CBR decontamination requirement. Decontaminants in use are standard materials employed by most nations and there is no evidence of any research program on new decontaminants for CW toxic agents.

DISCUSSION

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